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Résumé:       
 
Abstract: Should a manager be held accountable for uncontrollable environment factors 
like foreign exchange rate or oil price? To address this question, we develop a 
multi-task agency model where the agent has a limited liability. The profit of the 
firm is impacted by a stochastic environmental factor which changes the relative 
productivity of tasks, and whose realization is public ex-post. The agent-manager 
observes an early private signal of the environment and thus knows better than 
the principal which task it is optimal to undertake. For the principal, there is 
therefore a trade-off between congruity (induce the agent to use her information 
as the principal would use it) and agency costs (in particular to induce the agent 
to reveal this information). 
In our model, it is costly to make the agent responsible for the environment, not 
because the environment is uncertain, but because the agent has a better 
knowledge of the environment when the task is chosen. The optimal contract 
depends on the informativeness of the signal. For an highly informative signal 
the environment is not filtered from the performance measure to encourage a 
congruent action from the agent. For a poorly informative one, the environment 
is eliminated and the agent never reacts to it: congruity is given up to decrease 
the agency cost. We use this model to discuss the application of the controllability 
principle in the case of external environment factor. 
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